Negotiable Instruments -- Effect of Higher Interest Rate after Maturity -- Contract for Liquidated Damages or Penalty -- Effect Upon Negotiability by Eastman, John R.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 213
because of the ulcer he is unable to pursue his regular vocation or em-
ployment. Ohio is thus placed definitely in the majority liberal group.
In fact, the specific nature of the test would indicate that its position in
the group is well toward the front. H. D. R.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - EFFECT OF HIGHER INTEREST
RATE AFTER MATURITY - CONTRACT FOR LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES OR PENALTY - EFFECT UPON
NEGOTIABILITY
The defendants executed a promissory note to a bank, for which
the plaintiff was receiver, for $7000 due in one year, with interest at six
per cent per annum. In addition, it contained a provision that the note
should draw interest at eight per cent per annum after maturity to be
computed and paid semi-annually until the principal and accrued interest
were paid. In a suit on the note to recover eight per cent, the Court of
Appeals held that where money is paid by the borrower to the lender for
the use of money after it is past due it is regarded as liquidated damages,
and that the parties may stipulate in the lending contract for a rate of
interest after maturity higher than the rate before, but it must not exceed
the maximum rate prescribed by the usuary statute.'
This exact situation seems to be a case of first impression in Ohio.
However, there are two earlier cases somewhat related which furnish
an interesting comparison. In addition, a question arises as to the court's
interpretation of sec. 8303 Ohio G.C., that is, does this section expressly
authorize a stipulation for a higher interest rate after maturity than
before?
"In Ohio, the agreement is legal, expressly made so by statute (sec.
8303 G.C.)"' With those words, the court in the principal case accepts
'Hackett v. Kripke et al, 6z Ohio App. 89, 23 N.E. (2d) 438 (1939). In the princi-
psI ca e the provision in the note that it was to be eight per cent per annum "payable
, tmi-annually" v. a not discussed. A question arises as to whether or not this is usurious
indcr Siction S303 which provides that the interest must "not exceed eight per cent per
annum, payable annually." In Cook v. Courtright, 40 Ohio St. 248 (1883), the court held
that a tipulation that the interest was to be eight per cent per annum payable semi-annually
v~aq not uurious under Section 8,303. The court held that a contract to pay eight per cent
per annum on a given principal payable semi-annually, the interest to be paid on that prin-
cipal, is the same thing as eight per cent per annum payable annually upon the same prin-
cipal. However, under the same statute, if the interest is at eight per cent per annum pay-
able annually in advance, it is usurious. Thus, if a note is for $I2,OOO at eight per cent
per annum payable in advance and if the interest is deducted from the principal before
giving it to the borrower, the borrower pays eight and sixty-eight one hundredths per cent
on the amount actually received for his use. Insurasce Co. v. Carpenter, 40 Ohio St. 26o
(IS8 3 ). It is interesting to note that these two cases were decided during the same term.
S6ura note 5.
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the proposition that a higher rate of interest after maturity than before
maturity is a valid stipulation. A question arises as to whether or not
sec. 8303 expressly authorizes a higher rate of interest after maturity,
since the statute does not refer to it in any manner. The section in
question says that the parties may stipulate for the payment of interest
not exceeding eight per cent per annum.3 It does not expressly mention
rates either before or after maturity, and thus, if the higher rate is to be
authorized by the statute it would seem that it must be done by implica-
tion rather than by an express statement.
However, it would seem reasonable that such an implication may be
drawn. In Ohio, the parties have a right to stipulate for any interest
rate within the limits of sec. 8303 and the rate of interest so contracted
for will be enforced.4 After maturity, if no interest rate has been stipu-
lated, the interest rate before maturity will continue as the interest rate
for the period of the default.' From the fact that parties may under
this section contract for any rate of interest before maturity and that
rate will continue after maturity if no other rate is stipulated, it would
seem that the parties could contract for a higher rate after maturity than
they had contracted to pay before maturity, providing, however, that it
remains within the eight per cent per annum maximum. Especially is
this true in view of the attitude the Ohio court has taken where there
was no interest rate before maturity, but an interest rate after maturity,
the court holding that the note was a good contract and that the interest
could be collected.'
The first of the two cases mentioned for comparison is Ashrenr v.
Longworth.' In that case, a note for $iooo was given subject to yearly
interest, but, if each payment was made on or before due date only $8oo
and yearly interest would be required. The obligor paid $8oo but not as
required and then asked that his note be given up and cancelled. The
court held that the larger sum was in the nature of a penalty and pay-
ment of the less discharged the obligation. Two possible distinctions
immediately arise, they are: (i) in the Askren case, the provision was
not for interest but for a fixed sum, while in the principal case it was for
a Section 8303 Ohio G.C. provides: "The parties to a bond, bill, promissory note, or
other instrument of writing for the forbearance or payment of money at a future time, may
itipulate therein for the payment of interest upon the amount thereof a any rate not exceed-
ing eight per cent per annum, payable annually."
"Bunn v. Kinney, iS Ohio St. 40 (x864); Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer, z5
Ohio St. 6zI (1874)5 Mueler v. McGregor, 28 Ohio St. 265 (1876); McClelland v.
Sorter, 39 Ohio St. 12 (1883).
' Monnett v. Sturges, 25 Ohio St. 384 (x874) ; Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer,
supra note 4; Mueller v. McGregor, supra note 4-
'Bowler v. Houston, x Ohio Dec. Rep. 389 (1 8Sx).
715 Ohio St. 370 (1864).
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interest; (2) the Askren case would allow a deduction for compliance,
while the principal case permits a higher rate on default. As to the first
distinction, interest may readily be reduced to a sum and a sum may
readily be reduced to interest by a simple mathematical calculation. As
to the second distinction, Judge Wrhite says that whether the amount is
to be reduced by compliance, or increased on default, it is simply a mode
of expressing the same thing.' A third distinction, however, clearly sep-
arates the Askren case and the principal case. It is the obvious distinction
between a slightly higher rate of interest if the note is not paid and a
$200 increase if the debtor delays a single day. The latter, it would
seem, has no relation to the loss or damage suffered, but is a penalty for
missing the payment.
The second case is M4iller v. Kyle.' In that case, the note contained
a stipulation for the payment of attorney fees if the note was not paid at
maturit,; the court held that provision void as being against public
policy in that law suits would thereby be encouraged. The Miller case
and the principal case may be distinguished, first, on the ground that a
stipulation for attorney fees is not the same as a higher interest rate after
maturity; second, on the ground that there is no public policy involved
in the principal case. However distinguishable, there is a similarity among
the decisions regarding a stipulation for attorney fees and a stipulation
for a higher rate of interest after maturity. Some of the decisions hold
that the parties have a right to contract for the payment of attorney fees
as long as no law is violated, thus, the stipulation is valid.'" The same
theory supports the decisions sustaining the validity of a higher interest
rate after maturity." On the other hand, other courts have held that
a stipulation for attorney fees is void as against public policy, either be-
cause it is usurious '2 or because it is a penalty." Vhile the decisions
denying the validity of a higher interest rate after maturity do not say
the provision is against public policy they do regard it as a penalty and
void."4
In other jurisdictions where the question has been adjudicated, the
majority of the courts hold that a stipulation in an interest bearing note
Supra note 7, at page 375.
S5 Ohio St. x86, 97 N.E. 372 (19x9).
'" Commcrcial In'estment Trust v. Eskew, z6 Misc. 114, 212 N.Y. Supp. 71 (1925);
Rubnstcin v. Nourse, 7o F. (2d) 492 (Mo. 1934); Colley V. Summers Parrott Hard-
:,,re Co., xi9 Va. 439, 89 S.E. 9o6, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 375 (19x6).
"Infranotes x5, x6, 17.
- Ohio v. Ta~lor, xo Ohio 3 7 8 (184r).
llilhr v. Kv' lc, supra note 9; First Nalional Bank of Holly Grove v. Sudbury, izi
rh. 9, xo SA.W 470 (191).
" In fra note IS.
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that it shall bear a higher but lawful rate after maturity is a valid stipula-
tion.1" The theory of these courts is that the parties are free to contract
as they please for interest as long as the rate is lawful. Thus, in Linton v.
National Life Insurance Co.,"- the court held that a rate of ten per cent
was lawful and the makers of the notes had a right to agree to pay a
higher rate after maturity than they had contracted to pay before ma-
turity. In Red Bank Realty Co. v. South,'7 the court said that "so long
as the parties contract for a rate of interest that does not exceed the
maximum rate allowed by law, their contracts will be enforced as writ-
ten." And in the same case it was held that such contractual increase in
rate after maturity is regarded as liquidated damages for failure to pay
promptly and not as a penalty. Thus, the holding of the principal case
is in line with the majority of the cases.
The minority on the other hand regard the higher rate of interest
after maturity as a penalty and void. 8 In Minnesota, the courts have
regarded a higher rate after maturity as invalid, and the leading case
prior to the present statute held that the parties couldn't stipulate as to
interest after maturity at all. 9 However, the statute"0 now provides that
a contract shall bear the same rate after maturity as it did before ma-
turity, hence, a higher rate is void. In Illinois, on the other hand, such
an increase in interest after maturity has been regarded as a penalty but
nevertheless enforced. 2'
A question arises as to the effect of the decisions in regard to higher
interest stipulations after maturity on the negotiability of the note. The
first possibility would be to hold the stipulation void and the note non-
negotiable. In Cornish v. Woolverton,2 the Montana court held the
instrument non-negotiable, saying that the note is for an uncertain sum.
However, in Lister v. Dolan2 this same court held that the provision
for a higher rate was for a sum certain and that the instrument was
negotiable. The second possibility would be to hold the stipulation void
'5 "The validity of a stipulation in an interest bearing note that it shall bear a higher
but lawful rate after maturity is sustained by the majority of judicial decisions." sz A.L.R.
369, with annotations. See also, McKay's Estate v. Belknap Savings Bank, 27 Colo. 50,
59 Pac. 745 (x899); Finger v. McCaughey, xi4 Cal. 64, 45 Pac. 1004 (1896); Jackson
v. Fennimore, 104 Okla. 134, 230 Pac. 689 (1924).
0 04 Fed. 584 (19oo).
17 153 Ark. 380, 242 S.W. 21 (s92).
'Mason v. Callender, z Minn. 35o, 2 Gil. 302, 72 Am. Dec. oz (x858); Conrad
v. Gibbon, 29 Iowa 12o (1870); Walter v. Long, 6 Munf. (zo Va.) 71 (1818).
" Mason v. Callender, supra note 18.
' Mason's Minn. St. (9Z7) Sec. 7036. For a decision under this statute see Investor's
Syndicate v. Baskerville Bro's Holding Co., 2oo Minn. 462, 274 N.W. 6z7 (s937).
'Bradford and Son v. Hoiles, 66 Ill. 517 (1875); Laird v. Warren, 9Z Ill. 204
(1879); Hennessey v. Walsh, 242 Ill. App. 237 (19o8).
32 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4, io8 Am. St. Rep. s98 (i905).
85 Mont. 571, z82 Pac. 348, 7z A.L.R. 2 (i929).
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and the note negotiable. In Minnesota, the higher rate is void because
of a statute; 2" however, the courts have not allowed that to interfere
with the negotiability of the instrument.2" In Miller v. Kyle,2" the Ohio
court held that although the stipulation for the payment of attorney fees
was void, the instrument was none the less negotiable. The third possi-
bility would be to say that the stipulation is valid and the note is nego-
t;able. As has been said, the great weight of authority considers this
type of interest provision as valid."r It is also true that the great weight
of authority holds that this type of interest provision does not destroy the
negotiability of the instrument.2" In National Life Insurance Co. v. Sil-
ver,21 the Oklahoma court held that such a provision was a valid contract
as long as it did not contravene the usuary law, and in Moore v. Inter-
state Mortgage Trust Co.," the same court held that the provision did
not destroy negotiability. F.A.R.
USURY - APPLICABILITY OF OHIO G.C. SEC. 6 34 6 -5A
TO CREDIT UNIONS
The plaintiff, a credit union organized under Ohio G.C. sec. 9676
et seq., sued on a note for the sum of $823.04, with interest at the rate
of one per cent per month on the unpaid balance. The defendant pleaded
in avoidance that the plaintiff was subject to Ohio G.C. sec. 6346-5a,
which provides that a licensee under the Small Loan Company Act' shall
not charge any interest on loans in excess of $300.00 at a rate greater
than eight per cent per annum, under penalty of forfeiture of the right
to collect either principal or interest. It was held that the note was void
as violating this statute.2
The decision was unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. In the
first place, there was no mention of the Credit Union Act,' by virtue of
which the plaintiff is engaged in the loan business. Section 9683 pro-
" Supra note 20.
'Investor's Syndicate v. Baskerville Bro's Holding Co., supra note 2o.
85 Ohio St. 186 (i911).
'Supra note I5.
z "The same rule is applied where a note bearing interest is to bear a higher rate
from maturity if not paid; such a promise in a note does not, according to the weight of
authority render it non-negotiable." 2 A.L.R. 140. See annotations in 2 A.L.R. 14o and
41 A.L.R. 294. In addition, see Burns Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Friedman, 292 U.S. 4 S7, 78
L. Ed. 138O, 54 Sup. Ct. 8I3 (1934).
265 Okla. 85, 163 Pac. 274 (1916).
172 Okla. 471, 45 P. (zd) 485 (193)-
'Ohio G.C., sec. 6346-1 et seq.
Columbus Postal Employees Credit Union, Inc. v. Mitchell, 6z Ohio App. 343,
23 N.E. (zd) 989 (1939).
' Ohio G.C., see. 9676 ct seq.
